This study looks at the role of internal linkages in highly competitive clusters. Besides serving as a mechanism to source knowledge, we argue that strong internal linkages also represent tighter control over local innovation and higher levels of technological interdependency across locations, which allow firms to increase internalization and reduce the risk of knowledge outflow to competitors. Our empirical analysis of the global semiconductor industry shows that the industry leaders tend to intensify their internal linkages across location in response to the presence of direct market competitors but not to the presence of innovators in the same technological field. In addition, we find that such internal linkages are associated with more intra-firm knowledge flow and lower knowledge flow to competitors in the same cluster. Our results suggest that research in cluster innovation should take into account multilocation firms with linkages across locations, and their different responses to technological competition and market competition in the cluster.
Introduction
suggests that clusters reduce cost to co-located firms by providing convenient access to skilled labor, specialized suppliers, and knowledge spillovers. More recently, clusters are viewed as ferments for innovation in high-technology industries (Saxenian, 1994) and source of competitive advantage for firms. Locations with large number of firms and research institutions engaging in innovative activities next to each other facilitate knowledge flow through frequent interpersonal interactions (Jaffe et al. 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 1996) and labor mobility (Almeida and Kogut 1999) , providing a fertile ground for exchanging knowledge.
However, clusters are also spaces where competition for ideas occurs. Porter (1998) emphasizes the "vigorous competition among locally-based rivals". Shaver & Flyer (2000) argue that not all firms would benefit from co-locating; leading firms may even lose more than what they gain from a cluster. Looking at knowledge spillovers, a key input for innovation, Alcácer & Chung (2007) show that leading firms may shy away from manufacturing clusters. While firms and the R&D community at large gain from the knowledge flow in clusters, unintended knowledge outflows to competitors can weaken the competitive edge of leading innovators and compromise their ability to appropriate value from R&D. Yet in industries such as semiconductors, leading firms still flock to clusters and innovate in them. What enables leading firms in high-tech industries to benefit from clusters without risking their technological edge?
We address this question so we may refine our understanding of innovation in clusters. Specifically we examine whether firms respond to local competitive environments by strengthening their internal linkages, and whether stronger internal linkages effectively increase knowledge internalization and reduce local knowledge spillover to local competitors.
In section 2.1 we review the positive and negative aspects that leading innovators face in clusters according to previous research. More importantly, we bring the insight, absent in the literature, that leading players in clusters are often geographically dispersed organizations with intra-firm ties across multiple locations. Large multi-location firms are known for their ability to mobilize and integrate knowledge on a global basis (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1990) . Thus, to understand firms' local R&D strategies, we must recognize that a firm located in a particular cluster may also be part of a strategically integrated internal network. The innovation strategy of IBM in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, is intricately linked with the company's eight other R&D labs and hundreds of facilities worldwide. How firms organize their R&D activities internally will affect the extent to which they can appropriate value from local innovation in clusters. After surveying the appropriation mechanisms suggested in the innovation and strategy literatures in Section 2.2, we conclude that, by treating firms in abstract, these literature streams tacitly assume that knowledge appropriation is location-free.
Our arguments on how internal linkages lead to appropriability in a cluster are present in section 2.3. We recognize the dual nature of internal linkages. In one hand, internal linkages across a firm's geographically dispersed units can improve knowledge absorption and integration (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000) , increase the absorption of external knowledge at dispersed locations (Lahiri 2010) , facilitate the transfer of local knowledge back to the parent firm (Frost and Zhou 2005) , and improve the overall quality of innovation (Singh 2007) . On the other hand, these studies mostly focus on knowledge sourcing and value creation while overlooking the adverse effect of intensive local competition on knowledge appropriation, a critical component of firms' R&D strategies in highly competitive clusters.
We argue that internal linkages are a reflection of interdependence across locations and that this interdependency can foster appropriation. Since specialized and co-specialized complementary assets are critical to the value of an innovation (Teece 1986 ), a firm can minimize its loss from knowledge outflows by strategically increasing the interdependence between geographically dispersed R&D activities. This is in line with the disaggregation strategy suggested by Liebeskind (1996) -isolation of related knowledgeproduction or knowledge-use processes -as a mechanism to protect against knowledge outflows and Zhao (2006) , who finds that firms tend to develop disaggregated components in high risk countries and then integrate them at the firm level. Section 2.3 ends with the presentation of three propositions that guide our empirical setting. These propositions zoom in on a particular type of internal linkage, crosscluster teams, that was identified as key in a set of interviews with managers in the semiconductor industry.
Section 3 describes our empirical approach. The multi-dimensional relationships among local entities (Cohen 1995, 230) allow us to separate the appropriation incentives from knowledge sourcing incentives among multi-location firms. Firms in a technological cluster may share similar technological backgrounds or even engage in patent races, but they do not necessarily compete in the same product market. Industryspecific market information and other complementary resources reduce the risks associated with knowledge exchanges, allowing symbiotic relationships to develop. If internal linkages are purely mechanisms of knowledge sourcing, we should observe stronger internal linkages in clusters with greater knowledge pools, e.g., a large number of neighboring firms in the same technological field. If internal linkages serve as a hedge against knowledge outflows, they should be used more extensively when neighboring firms share the same product market.
Our empirical setting is innovation in the semiconductor industry. Specifically we analyze three innovation traits generated by the top 16 innovators in 25 clusters. Section 3.1 describes our data sources and section 3.2 our definition of clusters. We depart from previous research that defines clusters in terms of employment density reported in country-specific pre-determined geographic units. Instead, we identify clusters' contours using a mathematical algorithm whose input is patent inventor locations. Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 describe our models and variables.
Examining the largest innovating firms in the global semiconductor industry from 1998 to 2001, we find supportive evidence in section 4 for both the knowledge sourcing and the value appropriation goals of internal linkages, with much stronger results for the latter. Specifically, the leading firms are more likely to use cross-cluster teams for their R&D projects when surrounded by direct competitors, even after controlling for learning opportunities. We also find support for the effectiveness of this appropriation strategy: technologies produced by cross-cluster teams are more likely to be transferred internally to other locations of the same firm, but are less likely to be used by competitors in the same cluster. Thus, a closely-knit internal R&D network can be a source of competitive advantage in crowded clusters.
Interestingly, while the knowledge sourcing effect is significant among the general population in the cluster, the appropriation effect is significant only with market competitors, suggesting much targeted appropriation strategies. This sheds light on the seemingly contradictory coexistence of knowledge sourcing and knowledge appropriation in clusters: knowledge appropriation strategies targeted towards direct market competitors do not prevent knowledge sourcing by other players in the community. These findings are robust to extra tests described in section 5. Section 6 summarizes our results, contributions and suggestions for future research.
Empirically, our study offers a new methodology to define clusters, specially designed to compare clusters across countries. As a byproduct, the authors are making public location data for patents granted in the U.S. from 1969 to 2010; data that has been cleaned and contains latitude and longitude information for most inventors in the USPTO dataset. It also advocates for careful handling of patent data -for example by using patent families instead of patents and controlling for examiner patent citations.
Theoretically, our study offers several contributions to the innovation and international business literatures. First, it brings to the forefront a neglected dimension to the appropriation literature: location.
Actual knowledge outflows -hence the actions to prevent it -mostly happen at specific locations. It also highlights the role of location in the interaction between firms' technology and product-market strategies: local knowledge spillover does not have to get in the way of market competition if the complementary capabilities are spread across multiple locations. Second, our study challenges the cluster literature by pointing out the need to look at multi-location firms, and their organization across locations, to fully understand the dynamics of a specific cluster. As far as we know, we are also one of the first papers to analyze the appropriation effect of firms' internal linkages along with their knowledge sourcing effect.
While firms can source knowledge from a wide range of organizations in a technology cluster, the strategically organized internal linkages also allow firms to protect their innovations from a targeted set of market competitors. This in turn explains the paradox we propose at the beginning of the paper: how leading firms in high-tech industries can benefit from clusters without risking their technological edge.
Theoretical Development
In this section, we first analyze the features of clusters and why appropriation strategies are particularly important for firms surrounded by direct competitors. We further argue that, among the many mechanisms discussed in the literature, firms' internal linkages enable the multi-location firms to integrate local R&D with complementary assets residing elsewhere in the world, hence reducing the appropriation risk in clusters.
Clusters and Firm Heterogeneity
According to Porter (1998) , clusters are a prominent feature in the landscape of every advanced economy.
Starting with seminal work by Marshall (1920) , researches have shown that firms in an industry cluster benefit from knowledge spillover across organizations, access to specialized labor, and access to specialized intermediate inputs. Among the various activities along the value chain, R&D activities benefit the most from local knowledge spillover, and thus show the highest level of concentration (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Alcácer 2006) . Geographic proximity enables frequent interpersonal interactions through existing social networks (Almeida and Kogut 1999) and local institutions (Gilson 1999; Stuart and Sorenson 2003) , which facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge in clusters.
Knowledge, however, flows in both directions. Knowledge flowing into the firm (knowledge inflow) is likely to make R&D investments more productive, and thus raise the incentives to invest in R&D.
Meanwhile, knowledge flowing out of the firm (knowledge outflow) may hinder the firm's ability to appropriate value from its own innovations, thus lowering its incentive to conduct R&D in clusters (Furman et al. 2006) . In particular, losing knowledge to nearby competitors erodes the competitive edge held by industry leaders.
These firms can move away from clusters to protect their cutting-edge technologies (Shaver and Flyer 2000) , but this option may not be sustainable or desirable for two reasons. First, even if a leading firm decides to locate apart, it has little control over the subsequent location decisions of competitors or the emergence of new firms. To the extent that other firms have incentive to cluster around industry leaders, geographic distance offers only temporary protection against knowledge outflow. Second, there may be crucial resources in the cluster that the firm relies on, such as the talent pool from a local university.
Relocation would seriously compromise the firm's long-term competitiveness in the industry. Hence, protecting proprietary technologies from nearby competitors and appropriating value from innovation is a strategic consideration leading firms cannot avoid.
One feature that industry leaders can take advantage of is their geographically dispersed, yet closely integrated, innovation networks. The literature of clusters traditionally treats all local entities as standalone organizations. As a result, interactions among local competitors have been examined without much consideration of firms' extended organization. At the same time, most of the leading firms in high-tech industries are large firms with R&D activities in multiple locations -if not countries. As emphasized by Pisano (2006) , an industry's methods of appropriation are created by the strategic decisions of firms in that industry. Hence, the strategic allocation and integration of R&D activities by multi-location firms will have important implications for firms' interactions in clusters.
Appropriation Mechanisms
The innovation literature has discussed a wide range of strategies for value appropriation. In general, these strategies fall into two broad categories: raising the barriers, or reducing the incentive of imitation.
Firms may raise the imitation barrier by maintaining physical distance away from potential imitators (e.g., Shaver and Flyer 2000) . They may also implement organizational designs to ensure secrecy and manage information access. For example, rules and procedures are often in place to control both virtual access (e.g., password, color-coded databases) and physical access (e.g., USB drives, laptops, building security) to information. In fact, in both the 1987 Yale Survey and the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey, secrecy has been consistently identified as one of the most important mechanisms firms use to protect their R&D investment across a wide range of industries (Levin et al. 1987 , Cohen et al. 2000 .
Legal devices such as patents, trade secrets, non-compete and non-disclosure clauses also effectively increase imitation cost and deter information flows. Prior studies found that employees' awareness of trade secret handling procedures were positively related to the obligations they felt to protect trade secrets (Hannah 2005) . Even the corporate reputation for being "tough" in patent enforcement reduces the knowledge spillover associated with employee mobility (Agarwal et al. 2009 ).
Alternatively, firms can reduce the incentive of imitation by making it less appealing to outsiders. For example, technologies are valuable only when combined with the right complementary assets (Teece 1986 , Anand and Galetovic 2004 , Fosfuri et al. 2008 , including physical assets, marketing and managerial skills, brand names, know-how and technological capabilities. As a result, R&D is often firmspecific in its intended use, leading to heterogeneity across firms in terms of R&D applications and better appropriability of R&D returns by the innovating firms (Helfat 1994) . Similarly, to reduce the negative impact of knowledge outflow on firm performance, partners engaged in R&D alliances narrow the scope of their alliance activities to pure R&D projects when they are competitors in final product and geographic markets (Oxley and Sampson 2004) . Such design reduces direct market competition and hence increases the lead-time in the product market. Not surprisingly, the Carnegie Mellon Survey found complementary capabilities and the subsequent lead time as another important mechanism of knowledge appropriation (Cohen et al. 2000) .
While the above mechanisms are important in various circumstances, most of them treat firms as an abstract entity. However, knowledge flow is not location free; the actual spillovers -hence the actions to prevent it -mostly happen at specific locations. In this light, the gap in the knowledge appropriation literature is almost the opposite of that in the cluster literature: the appropriation literature discusses firms' strategic organization without paying much attention to the specific location characteristics, while the cluster literature emphasizes the role of location but overlooks the complex internal organization of firms. In the following discussion, we explore the interaction between firms' strategic internal organization and location characteristics, which we argue is an important aspect of learning and appropriation in clusters. In particular, we focus on a specific type of internal organization: internal linkages across locations.
Internal Linkages, Knowledge Sourcing and Knowledge Appropriation
Researchers have long recognized firms' internal linkages as effective means of knowledge sourcing, the absorption and integration of external knowledge. By establishing interactions across divisions or distance, internal linkages facilitate the accumulation and integration of knowledge (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1990; Kogut and Zander 1993) . Empirical evidence shows that strong internal linkages -evidenced by collaboration among inventors across distances -are conducive to the absorption of external knowledge (Lahiri 2010 ) and the knowledge flow from foreign subsidiaries to the parent companies (Frost and Zhou 2005) . Furthermore, such linkages also affect innovation quality. Singh (2007) shows that geographic dispersion of R&D, once accompanied by sufficient cross-regional ties among researchers from different R&D units, is associated with an improvement in innovation quality.
We argue that, in addition to the knowledge sourcing effect, internal linkages are also means of knowledge appropriation for multi-location firms. Specifically, we propose two mechanisms through which internal linkages can promote internalization and reduce the risk of unintended knowledge outflow.
First, internal linkages allow firms to maintain effective control over innovative activities at various R&D centers, which increases internal alignment of project progress across locations. Second, internal linkages are associated with strong technological interdependence within the firm, making innovations more valuable internally than to the outsiders. Below we explain these two mechanisms in detail.
Internal linkages as mechanism of control: Firms with strong internal ties can closely monitor the progress of R&D activities at each location to make sure that it is in alignment with the firm agenda.
Examples of such internal ties include the participation of researchers from other locations in local R&D projects (Nobel and Birkinshaw 1998) or the rotation of managers across units (Edstrom and Galbraith 1977) , as both are considered ways to improve coordination and control in multinational organizations.
Our interviews with R&D managers in large multinational firms in the semiconductor industry also suggest that, with frequent interactions among locations, valuable innovations can be promptly identified and sometimes transferred to a safer location, often at the headquarters or the firms' primary R&D centers.
Internal linkages as mechanism of internal interdependence: Firms with strong internal ties can better integrate innovation -wherever it emerges -with the complementary knowledge and resources within the firm, leading to stronger competitive position in the product market. Modularity with firm-specific interfaces is one example of such internal interdependence. Liebeskind (1996) proposes that firms can isolate various components of the same product so that none of the project teams can reproduce the product without the help of the others. In studies of multinational R&D strategies, Zhao (2006) The importance of interdependence in knowledge appropriation has also been discussed in more general settings. Using a theoretical model, Rajan and Zingales (2001) explain why flat hierarchies -in which all division managers are required to collaborate with a central unit at the top -are ubiquitous in human capital-intensive industries such as legal and consulting services. Because of the intangible nature of firm resources, property rights protection is difficult to enforce. Yet, if the firm can increase everyone's dependence on the center office by controlling access to certain key resources, the risk of expropriation is greatly reduced. In other words, the risk of knowledge outflows is reduced if the divisions of a firm are highly dependent upon each other.
Based on the above discussion, we argue that a firm can appropriate more value from its local R&D with the presence of stronger internal linkages with the rest of the firm. In the following analysis, we focus on a specific form of internal linkages: cross-cluster teams. Although there are many other concrete manifestations of internal linkages -from systematic meetings to enhanced communication mechanisms across clusters -our interviews have identified cross-cluster teams as an important form of value appropriation. More importantly, we are able to map cross-cluster teams to concrete data, and thus avoid analyzing the appropriation mechanisms in abstract terms.
Cross-cluster teams need to overcome technological, organizational and geographical barriers (Frost et al. 2002) and are costly to manage (Doz et al. 2006 ). Firms will only implement such strategies when the benefit outweighs the cost, namely when the threat to knowledge appropriation is high. Therefore, we expect to observe more cross-cluster teams at locations with higher appropriation risks, e.g. in clusters with a large number of direct competitors. Furthermore, if cross-cluster teams are effective in enhancing knowledge appropriation, we would expect two effects at the same time. On the one hand, cross-cluster teams facilitate the integration of local innovations with complementary knowledge in the firm.
Therefore, we would expect to see more intensive intra-firm knowledge flows across clusters with the presence of cross-cluster teams. On the other hand, cross-cluster teams reflect internal interdependence, increase the firm-specific nature of projects (i.e., stronger complementarities with firm-specific resources), and hence raise the learning barriers faced by outsiders. Therefore, we would expect to see less knowledge outflow to local competitors with the presence of cross-cluster teams.
Note that we are not dismissing the knowledge sourcing effect of the cross-cluster teams. In fact, we also expect to see more intensive use of cross-cluster teams when there are more learning opportunities in the cluster, where teams are used as tools of transferring locally absorbed knowledge back to the corporate center. That said, we argue that firms' strategic response to local appropriation risk is above and beyond the knowledge sourcing effect: cross-cluster teams should be more prevalent when firms perceive higher appropriation risk in the cluster, given the learning opportunities in the region. In the empirical analysis, we simultaneously analyze the dual roles played by cross-cluster teams and attempt to tease out the knowledge sourcing effect and the knowledge appropriation effect in multi-location firms.
Empirical Design
Our empirical design is conceptually based on the literature that looks at the interaction between a firms' technology and product-market strategies. The multi-dimensional relationships among local entities (Cohen 1995, 230) allow us to separate the appropriation incentives from knowledge sourcing incentives among multi-location firms. Firms in a technological cluster may share similar technological backgrounds or even engage in patent races, but they do not necessarily compete in the same product market. Industryspecific market information and other complementary resources reduce the risks associated with knowledge exchanges, allowing symbiotic relationships to develop. If internal linkages are purely mechanisms of knowledge sourcing, we should observe stronger internal linkages in clusters with greater knowledge pools, e.g., a large number of neighboring firms in the same technological field. If internal linkages serve as a hedge against knowledge outflows, they should be used more extensively when neighboring firms share the same product market. Specifically, our empirical strategy follows three steps: (1) determining whether firms are more likely to use cross-cluster teams in clusters with high levels of competitor firms, (2) testing whether innovations created by cross-cluster teams are used by other locations within the firm -an indication of internalization, and (3) determining whether those innovations associated to cross-cluster teams are less cited locally by competitors -an evaluation of cross-cluster teams as mechanism to appropriate knowledge.
Taken as a whole, the results from these three empirical analyses offer a thorough test of the propositions introduced in section 2.3. Although most variables used in each step are common (for example measurements that characterize the cluster competitive environment as described in section 3.5.1), there are differences in terms of dependent variables (section 3.3) and its associated model-specific control variables (section 3.5.1). Regardless of the specific analysis, all variables are calculated from the same data sources, and for the sample (section 3.1), and use the same cluster definition (section 3.2).
Sample
Our empirical setting is the worldwide semiconductor industry from 1998 to 2001. We choose this industry for several reasons. First, innovation is a key factor for success in semiconductors. Firms invest relentlessly in R&D to introduce new products and improve production processes (Stuart 2000) .
Moreover, semiconductor firms routinely patent their innovations, and patent data have been used to trace the traits and geographic distribution of innovation. Second, the benefit of knowledge transfer between firms has been shown to drive agglomeration in the industry (Saxenian 1994; Fleming et al. 2006) . High levels of geographic concentration also suggest that semiconductor firms have already developed strategies to manage knowledge outflows. Finally, this is a truly global industry: leading firms operate at multiple locations around the world, and there are significant differences between firms in terms of product markets, R&D portfolios, positions in the value chain, and geographic locations. Firms range from industry giants that participate in activities throughout the value chain to small enterprises that specialize in design (known as fabless) or testing, and from large multinational firms to small local firms.
Other players, such as universities, national laboratories, and firms from other industries (e.g., aerospace and chemicals) also conduct active R&D in semiconductors. Such heterogeneity allows us to identify the effect of different local competitive environments on firms' knowledge appropriation strategies and allocation of R&D projects.
We piece together our dataset from several sources. First, we identify innovating firms using patent data from the Derwent World Patent Index (DWPI), a well-recognized dataset that encompasses more than 30 million patent documents from 41 patent-issuing authorities worldwide, and we rely on Derwent's technological classification 1 Many of these patents are linked to the same innovation, with exactly the same inventors, assignees and abstracts. Multiple patents per innovation can occur either because patents are filed in multiple countries or because an application in a given country spins out multiple patents. Failing to recognize multiple patents associated to an innovation may lead to overestimate innovation output in a location -a given innovation would be counted multiple times -or to underestimate its backward and forward citations.
Thus, we follow Gittelman and Kogut (2003) and use Derwent families of patents as our unit of analysis.
Derwent defines membership to a given family based on a common priority document 2 . Each Derwent family encompasses patents granted in all countries that are identical in terms of technology, inventors, and locations, but differ in the scope of their claims. We restrict our sample to families that have at least one American member -e.g. those families that have at least one patent granted in the U.S. -and build forward and backward citation variables using only citations from and to American patents to avoid biases that originate from citation standards and practices that vary across legal jurisdictions. The final sample consists of 23,383 patent families whose assignees are American and foreign firms, universities, and government-and industry-sponsored research labs. Patent families have an average of 2.6 foreign patent members and 1.2 American patent members 3 1 DWPI applies a consistent classification system to all patents. Classes used in this study are U11 (semiconductor materials and processes), U12 (discrete devices), U13 (integrated circuits) and U14 (memories, film and hybrid circuits). For more details, see http://scientific.thomson.com/support/patents/dwpiref/reftools/classification.
. For the 624 patent families with more than one assignee, all assignees (and not only the first one) are considered. 2 The first member of the patent family to enter the DWPI database is referred to as the basic member. Basic members are identified by comparing the priority data on a newly received patent document with the priority data already in the DWPI database. If the priority data on the new document does not match the priority data of any previously processed document, then the new document is considered to be basic member and a new DWPI record is created with a unique family ID. When additional documents are subsequently received by Derwent that match the priority data of the basic members, then these are referred to as convention equivalents -based on the Paris convention agreement. In addition to using priority data comparisons, Derwent's technology experts also examine patent documents to identify non-convention equivalent family members -applications filed after the 12-month convention period but that are related to a given patent in DWPI. 3 To be part of our sample, a patent family needs to have at least one American member. using an alternative sample composed of the top 30 firms, the top 5% of patent output, and obtain similar results.
Cluster definition
Defining clusters is a crucial step of our empirical setup. Three elements must be specified in a cluster definition: the variable that would be used to identify concentration levels of economic activity, the geographic unit over which such a variable would be measured and the threshold concentration level above which a location can be considered a cluster. Our definition of clusters departs from most previous work in these three dimensions. Third, we define clusters by the actual distribution of inventor locations, following a three-step approach (see Appendix A for a more detailed explanation and comparison to alternative methods)
. We do this for two reasons. First, there is no single administrative unit defined across all countries. We have to either focus on a specific country (e.g., the U.S.), which fails to capture important features of global firms, or use a mix of different geographic units (e.g., states in the U.S., prefectures in Japan, and provinces in Europe), which may create unexpected country biases. Second, technological clusters do not necessarily follow predetermined administrative boundaries, which is clear after a quick inspection of inventor locations in, for example, the northeastern U.S. or central Japan. One administrative unit may encompass multiple clusters, while one technological cluster may expand across several administrative lines. 8 7 Alternatively, we identify clusters using a traditional algorithm: hierarchical clustering with centroid linkages and re-estimated all models. The results from using this alternative definition are discussed in the robustness section and are similar in terms of magnitude, sign and statistical significance to those presented in this paper.
. In step one, we identify the location of each element in the sample (i.e., a patent inventor, plant, fabless company, or scientific publication) and match the locations to two comprehensive sources of geographic names. For U.S. locations, we obtain latitude and longitude information for all 38,261 locations in the country from the Geographic Names Information System (GNIS) of the U.S. Geological Survey. For foreign locations, we use the Geonet Names Server (GNS) of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Besides its wide coverage of 5.5 million location names worldwide, the GNS dataset uses phonetic variations to capture spellings from a different alphabet (as in Asian countries) and from an alphabet with extra characters (as in Scandinavian and Slavic countries). Ambiguous matches are checked manually by native residents from various countries and areas. As a result, we are able to assign latitudes and longitudes to 61,385 of the 61,461 foreign locations in the original sample. In the second step, we develop a mathematical algorithm to identify geographic clusters using the latitude and longitude information. In the second step, clusters are defined not only by the geographic distance among locations -as in many other traditional clustering methods -but also by the variations in inventor density in neighboring areas. For example, a rapid decrease in density may signal the end of a cluster, and a continuous level of inventor density may signal a long or irregularly shaped cluster. Accordingly, the algorithm assigns two locations to the same cluster if there is a continuity of high-density locations between them, despite their geographic distance.
In contrast, two locations separated by a stretch of low-density areas may be identified as two distinct clusters, even if they aren't far apart. Our clustering algorithm offers the additional advantage of having the number of clusters emerge organically from the data, instead of being set arbitrarily ex ante. This method produces 304 geographic units. In the final step, plants, fabless companies, and publications are assigned to the geographic units defined from the patent data. In most cases, they fall within an existing geographic unit. For each location that falls out of all existing units, we calculate its shortest distance to them. The location is considered part of the closest cluster if the minimum distance is less than 15 miles 9 Although the previous process generated 338 geographic units, not all of them qualify as clusters.
Numerous approaches have been used to determine whether a geographic concentration of economic activity is large enough to be categorized as a cluster. For example, Ellison and Glaeser (1996) which contain 84% of all patent families (88% of American patents), 57% of plants, 67% of fables and 76% of publications. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the clusters used in our analysis.
Models
To identify firms' strategic organization of R&D projects across clusters, we compare the technologies developed in different local competitive environments, controlling for firm and patent characteristics.
Specifically we explore three dimensions of innovations; whether the innovation is associated to inventors located across clusters, whether this type of innovation is internalized -cited as prior art by innovations developed in other clusters, and whether the innovation is less cited by competitors in the same cluster.
Although the models estimated in each dimension differ in terms of dependent variables and some independent variables, they all follow the following general structure:
Where DepVar fict is one of three variables -cross_cluster fict , cross_cluster_self_citation fict , and local_citation_by_competitor fict -(described in section 3.4) for steps 1, 2 and 3 respectively, C ict is a vector of cluster-specific variables capturing the competitive environment faced by firm i in cluster c and year t ( described in Section 3.5.1), X f is a vector of patent family-specific variables (described in Section 3.5.2), Y ict is a vector of firm-specific variables characterizing firm i in cluster c and year t (described in Section 3.5.2), Z ct is a vector of location characteristics in year t (described in Section 3.5.1), 
Dependent variables
.
Cross-cluster teams:
Geographically dispersed R&D in a multi-location firm makes it more difficult for local competitors to access the technology know-how residing in the firm's other subsidiaries, thus reducing knowledge outflow. Teams spanning multiple clusters can also facilitate 11 We explored whether our data is better suited for negative binomial estimation than for Poisson estimation through a set of Hausman tests that compared both models. Our results, explained in more detail in sections 4.2 and 4.3, favor the use of negative binomial estimation.
the transfer of local know-how throughout the organization (Lahiri 2010) . Thus, we define cross_cluster fict as a binary equal to 1 if the patent family has inventors that are from at least two different clusters.
Cross-cluster self-citations:
A key concept in this study is the extent to which an innovation creates value for the innovating firm. While there is no direct measure of value, technologies highly dependent on internal resources are more likely to be utilized and further developed within the firm. Trajtenberg et al. (1997) propose self-citations, defined as "the percentage of citing patents issued to the same assignee as that of the originating patent," to measure the "fraction of the benefits captured by the original inventor." Hall et al. (2005) Two issues related to citation-based measurements are worth exploring further. First, citation measures capture both the intensity and speed of citations. As our observation window ends in September 2010, any citations that occur after that date are not included in the sample. Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) show that the lag of forward citations peaks at around five years. The period to accumulate citations in our sample ranges from seven to nine years, so our citations should represent the bulk of citations to be received 12 Second, a common critique of citation-based measurements is the unknown nature and extent of citations imposed by patent examiners (Jaffe et al. 2000) . Recent research reveals that examiner citations account for 66% of all citations in an average patent, which may bias empirical tests (Alcácer and Gittelman 2006; Sampat 2009 ). To avoid this problem, our main models are estimated using citations listed by assignees only. In our sample, about 30% of the patent families that receive at least one inventor citation also have at least one self-citation. The number is 38% when both inventor and examiner citations are considered. For robustness checks, we also repeat our analysis using all citations to a patent regardless of their source.
. We also include time fixed effects (ζ t ) to account for variations in citations across cohorts and to control for year-specific events that may affect patents applied in that year.
Independent variables

Characterizing cluster Competition (C ict ):
Firms sharing the same technological space have better absorptive capacity for each other's knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) , so the likelihood of knowledge outflow is larger in areas with many firms doing the same type of R&D. Meanwhile, such knowledge outflow will only create high risks if the recipients are aiming for the same product market (Dushnitsky and Shaver 2009 ). Therefore, we follow two dimensions -technology space and product market -to characterize the competitive environment at the cluster-year level.
Along the technology space, competitors are defined generically as organizations that innovate in the semiconductor field. The variable innovators represents the number of unique assignees with semiconductor patents in a given cluster-year. We then classify assignees into two groups:
innovators_profit and innovators_nonprofit to capture the number of for-profit and nonprofit assignees, respectively. In addition, we use the status information on patent applications to further classify for-profit assignees into small or large entities, thus creating the variables small_innovators and large_innovators. In the case of nonprofits assignees, we manually classify them into three groups: universities (universities), government agencies (govt_innovators), and other nonprofits such as research centers sponsored by industry associations (other_nonprofit).
Along the second dimension, competitors are defined as firms that share the same productmarket. For every focal firm in our sample, we rely on Hoover's Online to identify its industry (four-digit SICs), market segments within semiconductors
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Other cluster variables (Z ct ): We complete the characterization of local innovation environments with three more variables: plants_in_cluster, fabless_in_cluster, and publications_in_cluster, which represent the numbers of plants, fabless companies and publications per cluster-year.
, and the names of direct competitors.
Then we count the number of for-profit assignees in the same industry (in_industry and not_in_industry), in the same market segment (in_segment and not_in_segment), or on the list of direct competitors (competitors and not_competitors). The self-reported competition data from Hoover's serves our purpose well, since managers make strategic moves based upon perceived competition in a technology cluster.
Zhao (2006) shows that internalization varies according to the property rights regime of a given country. Thus we also control for variations in country-specific intellectual property right regimes by a set of country dummies τ ctry .
Characterizing patent families (X f )
As discussed in section 2.3, cross-cluster teams and internalization can be associated to knowledge sourcing. To control for this alternative explanation, we create a set of dummy variables that indicate whether any patent member of the focal family cites prior art granted to assignees in the same cluster 14 .
These variables are defined according to the competition measurement used in a specific model: ; cites_local_profit fc is equal to 1 for families with at least one patent member citing an assignee that is classified as a for-profit entity; cites_local_industry fc if the citation is to assignees in the semiconductor industry; cites_local_segement fc if there is any citation to assignees in the same segment and cites_local_competitor fc if there is any citation to competitors.
16 13 Hoover's reports 13 segments under semiconductors, including memory chips and modules, microprocessors, etc.
. Although our sample was drawn by sampling by technology, our results may also be driven by technological differences within semiconductors; therefore we add a set of dummy variables by technology classes (γ tech ).
Finally, some patent-family variables are relevant only for specific analyses. For example, in step 2 -testing for cross-cluster self-citations, we control for the baseline propensity that a patent is more selfcited because of sheer size of subsequent patents granted to a firm. Specifically we construct a patentvariant variable patent_stock fit as the number of patents that firm i obtained between the time the first patent within a focal firm was granted until September 2010. In steps 2 and 3 total_citations ft -defined as total number of citations received by American patents in family f -is used as the exposure variable for negative binomial models. Since the coefficients for exposure variables are forced to be 1, we are essentially estimating the ratios of cross-cluster self-citations to total citations in step 2, and the ratio of citations by local competitors to total citations in step 3.
Characterizing firms (Y ict )
Technologies closely linked to manufacturing or product design may have different characteristics from others. In addition to variables measuring local environment described in section 3.5.1, we use two dummy variables, with_plant ict and with_fabless ict , to indicate whether a particular firm has plants or fabless units in cluster c and year t. Both variables vary by firm-cluster-year and are used in steps 1 and 2.
Finally, Alcácer et al. (2008) show that firms differ significantly in their practices to cite prior art. As a consequence, we also add firm fixed effects (υ i ) to control for these differences and any firm timeinvariant characteristic.
Empirical results
Are firms more likely to use cross-cluster teams when there are more competitors nearby?
The first step in our analysis is to determine whether innovations generated by cross-cluster-teams are more likely to emerge in clusters with higher levels of competitor presence. The model to estimate this is the following: Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation 2 using logit. Standard errors are clustered by geographic cluster.
The positive coefficients of innovator_profit, large_firms, in_industry, in_segment and competitors suggest that the presence of competing organizations increases the tendency to use cross-cluster teams.
For example, according to column 7, an increase in one standard deviation in the number of competitors increases the likelihood of using a cross-cluster team (roughly six new competitors) by 48%
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Evidence of cross-cluster teams to channel local knowledge acquired in the cluster to distant units within the firms is mixed. The dummy variable for backward citations is positive and significant only when it implies citations to any type of assignees, but not citations to competitors or firms in the same segment or industry. That is, knowledge sourcing from market competitors does not trigger the use of cross-cluster teams, suggesting that "reverse knowledge integration" suggested by Frost and Zhou (2005) , if it occurs, is mostly from non-competitive institutions such as universities, research institutes and innovators that are not direct competitors.
. Note that the number of nonprofit innovators has no effect on the use of cross-cluster teams.
Two other variables deserve further comments. Having a plant in the cluster increases dramatically the chances of having a cross-country team. This may reflect innovations in manufacturing that requires coordination across production sites or specialized knowledge that resides in central R&D labs. Higher quality innovations -those innovations with more claims -are also more likely to be associated to crosscluster teams. Given the higher level of coordination that cross-cluster teams require, it is not surprising that firms are more inclined to use them when the potential benefits are higher.
Taken together these findings suggest that high levels of competitors in a cluster, not of other types of innovators, are linked to cross-cluster teams and that cross-cluster teams seem to be associated to appropriation rather than knowledge sourcing.
Are innovations created by cross-cluster teams more likely to be used at other locations within the firm?
The second step in our analysis is to determine whether innovations generated by cross-cluster-teams are more likely to be cited by innovations created by the same firm in other clusters. The model to estimate is the following: Table 4 indicates that cross-cluster team patents receive 0.5 more cross-cluster self-citations, 40% of the average cross-cluster self-citations in the sample. The result is robust, in magnitude and significance, across specifications that vary in their characterization of competitors in the cluster.
The total number of innovators in the cluster does not seem to have a significant impact on internalization. The effect of local competition emerges only when firms compete in the product market and not when entities employ similar technology in different markets. Across various specifications of local competitive environment, the coefficient on the number of local competitors is positive and significant. The more market competitors there are in a cluster, the more likely firms are to self-cite patents they develop there. Note that this effect is after controlling for innovations being developed by cross-cluster teams; therefore other mechanisms that enhance internalization -mechanisms that we do not measure directly -must be at play. To the extent that self-citations proxy for internalized value, this finding supports the argument that in highly competitive environments, firms are more likely to share technology development across the firm. Meanwhile, the presence of nonprofit innovators has little impact on the degree of internalization. Without direct market competition, these nonprofit institutions
create a more open atmosphere in the local cluster.
Together, these findings suggest that firms do change the type of innovation performed depending on local competitive environments beyond using cross-cluster teams. Innovation produced in clusters with a strong presence of direct competition is more tightly intertwined with the firm's internal knowledge base.
Note that there is little support to the argument that the internalization process across clusters is due to knowledge sourcing: families that draw from assignees' local innovation are not more likely to generate cross-country self-citations. Not surprisingly, the coefficient patent_stock is positive and significant; the larger the pool of later patents, the more likely that later citations are made to the focal patent. The coefficient of with_plant is also positive and significant, indicating that technologies closely linked to manufacturing processes are more firm-specific.
Note that the high cross-cluster self-citation ratios in competitive clusters are not due to the low intrinsic value (small denominator) of these patents: we fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for claims is distinct from zero. Additionally, when running the same regressions in Table 5 but with total number of citations instead of cross-cluster self-citations as the dependent variable, none of the coefficients associated with competitive environments are significant.
Are innovations created by cross-cluster teams less used by competitors?
Our final step is to evaluate cross-cluster teams as mechanism to appropriate knowledge by determining whether those innovations associated to cross-cluster teams are less cited locally by. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: Innovations associated to cross-cluster teams reduce the number of citations of local innovations generated by competitors. For example, for model 7 in Table 6 -our more precise measurement of competition -innovations associated to cross-cluster teams receive 0.56 less local citations by competitors those who are not cross-cluster teams. This finding supports our hypothesis that cross-cluster teams are an effective appropriation mechanism. If cross-cluster teams were solely associated to learning and knowledge sourcing, we would not expect this result. This is after controlling for knowledge sourcing through the backward citation variables, whose coefficients are positive and significant in models 1 and 2.
In Table 6 , variables associated to different types of competition in a cluster (innovators, innovators_profit, in_industry, in_segment, competitors) can be interpreted as capturing the risk set that may drive local citations: the more assignees of a given type are in cluster, the more patents they can obtain there and the more likely these patents cite patent families in our sample. Statistically-significant positive coefficients would represent the sheer size effect described above; statistically-significant negative coefficients would indicate that appropriation mechanisms, besides cross-cluster teams, are so effective that citations by competitors decrease even when their sheer numbers increase. As expected, most coefficients are positive and statistically significant suggesting that those other alternative appropriation mechanisms may not be effective. However, the fact that for model 7 -a model with the most accurate competition measurement -the coefficient is not significant and that these alternative mechanisms have not been measured explicitly suggest that more research is required.
In terms of control variables, more valuable innovations are more likely to be cited by other assignees in the cluster, being competitors or not.
Robustness checks
The above findings are consistent with our hypothesis that R&D projects in competitive clusters are more internalized across clusters, and are less used by nearby competitors. Next, we conduct a series of robustness tests using alternate samples, variable definitions, and estimation techniques.
First, Table 1 shows high positive correlations among variables that characterize clusters, namely number of plants, fables, publications and assignees (after all, clusters by definition are locations with higher levels of economic activity). Because multicollineartity increases standard errors it is less likely that coefficients will be statistically significant. In other words, strong correlation among the cluster variables works against us finding any significance for the local competitive effect, which we obtain anyway.
Nonetheless we re-estimated models in Tables 4, 5 Second, we re-estimate all models with a different method to define clusters: hierarchical clustering with centroid linkages. This method begins with each location as a separate group. Then two clusters with the shortest Euclidian distance are combined into one, whose new geographic coordinates are the mean longitude and latitude of all locations in the group. This process is repeated until a large hierarchical tree is generated that includes all locations. We designate the number of clusters in each region to accommodate a wide variation in local densities. The coefficients obtained with the hierarchical clustering method are similar in sign, significance and magnitude to those in the previous tables.
Third, we repeat the analysis on self-citation ratios using both inventor and examiner citations. Recent research suggests that high levels of examiner citations are associated with low quality patents (Alcácer and Gittelman, 2006; Sampat, 2009) . Therefore, including these citations adds a new set of observationspatents whose citations are 100% examiner-imposed -that may represent inferior innovations. The results using citations from all sources are similar in magnitude and sign too, but weaker in statistical significance than those in Table 2 .
Finally, we estimate the models extending our sample to the top 5% of semiconductor firms (30 firms) while keeping 25 clusters and obtain similar results in terms of sign, magnitude and statically significance to those of our baseline models.
Discussion
While geographic collocation has obvious benefits for firm innovation, it can also have serious drawbacks. We explore how leading innovators can tap into technology clusters' rich resources while still appropriating value from their R&D investments. Our empirical findings suggest that the internal linkages of multi-location firms play an important role in knowledge appropriation, even after the knowledge sourcing opportunities are controlled for. Specifically, by increasing control and intra-firm interdependency across locations, internal linkages facilitate knowledge internalization and at the same time reduce knowledge flow to nearby competitors. We also find that firms' strategic responses vary depending upon the characteristics of local organizations. Firms tend to intensify their internal linkages when neighboring firms share the same product market, but not when they overlap in the technological space.
We believe that our study sheds light on some important aspects of location and innovation strategies. By studying the interaction between firms' strategic internal organization and location characteristics, we contribute to the appropriation literature that treats firms as abstract entities, and to the technology cluster literature that overlooks the complex internal organization of firms. We argue that a geographically dispersed organization, if managed properly, can be a competitive advantage not only in knowledge sourcing but also in knowledge appropriation. Therefore, we can achieve better understanding of the dynamics in technology clusters by bringing multi-location firms and their strategic organization into the picture.
Our findings also have important implications to both innovating firms and policy makers. For firms making location decisions, this study shows that highly competitive technology clusters are not a forbidden land for industry leaders. The risk of exposing certain technologies to local competitors is also low if these technologies are highly dependent on internal resources residing somewhere else. For policymakers eager to nurture local high-tech industries, our findings suggest that attracting leading innovators to the location is only part of the job. Tax breaks and other incentives may influence where R&D is conducted, but not how the R&D projects are actually organized. With local projects closely intertwined with the firms' global research agenda, the same R&D budget or R&D intensity may generate very different knowledge outflows to the local community.
Admittedly, there remain several limitations in this study. For example, this is a one-industry study with a small group of leading innovators in the industry; further analysis with more diverse contexts will make the conclusions more generalizable. Also, we rely on the patent data to capture innovation and knowledge flow, which leaves out other forms of knowledge and knowledge flow. Finally, there may be other mechanisms at play that allow the industry leaders to alleviate appropriation concerns. For example, given their common presence in the major clusters around the world, the leading semiconductor firms are in a typical multi-market contact situation (Bernheim and Whinston 1998) in which competition may be attenuated. It is impossible for us to outline all the other mechanisms, but the fact that we observe stronger internal linkages in the presence of competitors -even with the possibilities of multi-market contact and other attenuating mechanisms -makes our estimates conservative.
This study also points to several avenues for further inquiry. First, although the mechanisms discussed in this paper are based on multi-location firms, the need to appropriate economic rents from proprietary innovation applies to any firm or organization. Some aspects of internalization strategies are more generally applicable, such as the separation of complementary components in a R&D project, but the implementation of such strategies gets much harder without the geographic separation in multi-location firms. Further research on internal organization and knowledge appropriation may explore other types of strategic organization that are less location-specific.
Second, the strategies discussed in this study are based on a well-established set of internal routines and organizational skills that facilitate the transfer and integration of geographically dispersed knowledge.
Essentially we are talking about the effect of internal linkages (an organization issue) on the assimilation of R&D knowledge (a technological issue) in the face of competition (a product market issue). However, organizations evolve slowly and internal linkages take time to develop, so they may not always be in sync with changes in technological or competitive environments. Moreover, not every firm can manage the internal linkages with enough efficiency or cost effectiveness. Hence, it is important to understand how firm heterogeneity affects the applicability of these strategies.
Finally, our arguments revolve predominantly around competition and have excluded the possibility of inter-organizational cooperation. However, there are frequent project collaborations, strategic alliances, and industrial consortia among semiconductor firms, universities, and other research institutions. 
